◆ SpookStack

41. (Continued) as approved on September 6, was now outmoded, that more dynamic action was indicated, that hesitancy about overflights must be re~ _ considered (this to be commented on later in this memorandum), that actions which could be attributed to indigenous Cubans would not be important or very effective, and that a very considerable amount of attribution and "noise" must be expected. As a result, General Lansdale was instructed to give con- sideration to new and more dynamic approaches, the specific items of sabotage should be brought forward immediately and new ones conceived, that a plan for mining harbors should be developed and presented, and the possibility of capturing Castro forces for interroga- tion should be studied. a respect to overflights,. were instructed to prepare and present to the Special Group on next Tuesday at a special meeting alternate recommendations for over- flights. These to include the use of U-2s on complete sweeps (as contrasted with peripheral or limited missions), the use of firefly drones, the use of 101s or other reconnaissance planes on z low level, intermediate level, and high level missions, and other possible reconnaissance operations. , Consideration was given to stating publicly that we propose to overfly Cuba in the interest of our own security and the security of the Western Hemisphere, and then to proceed even though doing so in- volved risk. It was the consensus that we could not accept restrictions which would foreclose gaining all reasonable knowledge of military instal- lations in Cuba. During the meeting McCone reviewed the earlier meeting with General Lansdale, and pointed out to the group that this meeting clari- fied General Lansdale's authority over the entire MONGOOSE operation and that the CIA organization was responsive to his policy and operational guidance, and this was thoroughly understood.