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ADocumentaryHistoryOfTheCubanMissileCrisis1962
Page 148
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47, (Continued)
— _SEORET
~Ze«
©. Perhaps we should get in touch with Castro through «
third party and tell him it was now or never and that he was
selling Cuba down the river by getting involved with Soviet
missile bases;
f, We should try to create maximum confusion and not
worry too much about the noise level. Here he was referring
to infiltration and sabotage efforts;
g. We should review our policy on a provisional govern-
ment and try to get all the various factions working together,
In any event, we must keep Cuba isolated from the Free World
although in doing so we must aot isolate ourselves,
3. In the final analysis Mr. Rusk felt that we had to either make
a quick surprise attack and knock out these hases or to lay on a heavy
propaganda barrage in all areas which might cause a withdrawal.
Rusk stated that we could not in our thinking separate Berlin and other
trouble areas in the world. He seemed deeply troubled and did not
seem fiym in any of his proposale but appeared to have been boxing
the compass as to courses of action.
4. Mr. McNamara poiated out that if we are going to take overt
military action, it must at all costs be done on a 100% basis and before
any of the missiles become operational, General Taylor pointed out
that the element of surprise would be essential but since this would
then be 2 one-shot operation, wa should establish an immediate blockade
and then look toward invasion aithough this latter prospect did aot
enthuse him. He stated that the decision to invade would be the hardest
one to make because of the long-time involvements and the lack of any
substitute for the Castro regime. Mr. Bundy pointed out that the
Soviet decision must have been made early in the summer and that
these missiles probably arrived in Cuba at about the time the President
was making his policy statements. Bundy thought there was a real
possibility that Khrushchev may be confused or misled as to the temper
of the American people and the intimate concern we all have over Cuba.
§. The President pointed out that the missiles certainly had to
be removed one way or another, and stated that he would meet again at
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