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ADocumentaryHistoryOfTheCubanMissileCrisis1962
Page 279
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85. McCone, Memorandum for the File, “Executive Committee
Meeting on 23 October 1962, 6:00 p.m.”
be ——_—~--
23 October 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
6:00 p.m. All members present plus Counsel
for Defense Department
1. Committee reviewed the blockade proclamation and
approved it. It was signed by the Fresident at 6:00 p.m.
2. The President instructed McNamara to review all details
of instructions to the Flect Commanders regarding procedures to be
followed in the blockade. There was an extended discussion of
actions to be taken under various assumed Soviet reaistance
activities such as (2) failing to stop, (b) refusing right to board,
(c} ships turning around, heading in another direction, etc.
|
|
| SUBJECT: Executive Committee Meeting on 23 October 1962
}
3. Discuebion of the effect on U.S. industry by chartering
and preampting the use of 20 or 30 American ships. Gilpatric
reported that this would have little or no effact on the American
economy. McCone questioned these findings; however Gilpatric
said that this had been thoroughly studied and McCone's concerns
as expressed at the morning meeting were unfounded. The Attorney
General stated that it was within the law to use foreign bottoms,
however decision was made to preempt U.S. bottoms and not worry
about the consequences because they would not be serious.
4. The President urged that Norstad be retained at SHAPE
during the period of crisis, perhaps until 1 February 63. He
indicated Lemnitser might be used as CINCEUR with Norstad
remaining as SACEUR. Bundy stated that this is complicated as
the two posts are so co-mingled that they really must be held by
ons man. Taylor raised question that if this was done it would
hart Lemnitser's prestige. The President said that he felt that
Norstad was so experienced and s0 capable and his judgment se
sound, as evidenced by today's cable, copy cf which I have not seen,
that he would take the risk of NATO country criticiams, he did not
think that Lemnitser would be hurt, and he wished Norstad to remain.
Defense to take under advisement and report within 24 hours.
4. In the prolonged discussion of report on Civil Defense
problems, the President seemed particularly concerned over the
situation if we should launch attacks which might reault in four or
five missiles being delivered on the United States. DOD spokesmen
stated that the area covered by the 1100 mile missiles involved
92 million people. They felt that fall-out space was available though
teP-SEGaET
291
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