◆ SpookStack

111. (Continued) telligence exempted CIA's from this ingunction, the 2 instructions information from any of the rsfugee or agent ee et G)-. rd interpreted the Pres Se a tear $i ch ke bt fne President's directive restricting the publication of intelligence on offensive weapons was clearly wise, necessary, and essential to the national interest, The nisinterpretations of this directive endangered the necessary flow of information and seecve as a warning thst in future situations requiring such restrictions attention must be given to estatlishing secure channels for transmission of vital information to officials having a cleer need to know. . Rnorvency Planning ‘The Cuba experience points up the need for advance planning to ensure that our human end material intelligence resources are sufficient, and are adequately organized, to meet the demands of ‘an emergency such as that which confronted our Government in this instance, When the President found it necessary to restrict the publi- gation of information on offensive missiles in Cuba and to confine such information to designated categories of recinients, the in- telligence community did not have in readiness a plan to meet the reporting requirements of such an emergency, As a result, signifi- cant information did not reach some elements of the Government, both in Washington and the military commands, and in some instances importent intelligence was not brought to the attention of the President and some other high officials. Tyo examples of the con- sequences which followed were (1) officials who checked in normal piaces concerning such matters as the October 10 speech of Senator Keating were told that there was no evidence of offensive weapons, although in fact raw intelligence had already led to the targeting _of the San Cristobal area where offensive missile installations were’ subsequently found through U-2 photography on October 14, and (2) for a brief period the limitation on publication operated in such fashion as to preclude the. Defense Intelligence Agency fron: disseminating outside the Washington area intelligence publica- tions on the developing Cuba situation, As a consequence, 1% was necessary to call in ‘certain military commanders fromthe field cue FOP-~SRCRET