◆ SpookStack

12. (Continued) 12. On 13 September you cabled our views of the importance of going ahead with securing release of Cuban prisoners. Included in this cable was the following: "Also I continue to be concerned that the establishment of defensive equipment and installations is merely a prelude to the location of an offensive weapons capa- bility and once this is done, the implementation of our policy as reported in the press might be extremely difficult and involve unacceptable dangers. "! 13, The following day (14 September), at the Special Group (Augmented) meeting, Colonel Steakley outlined capabilities for low-level coverage of certain targets in Cuba. It was noted that the Secretary of Defense did not wish this operation considered further until the results of Agency reconnaissance in the same area were available. Further conclusion was thus deferred until the next week's meeting, although Elder's memorandum for the record reveals that General Carter pushed hard to keep the Group disposed toward a favorable consideration later, 14, On 16 September you again cabled extensive comments on the Cuban situation making the point that we must carefully study the prospect of MRBM!'s in Cuba. General Carter directed that 2 copy of this cable be given to the DD/I and assigned action responsi- bility to the DD/I. The DD/I's response, contained in a cable to you on 18 September, stated that an introduction of MRBM!'s was unlikely because of the risk of U. S. intervention. 15. At the USIB meeting of 19 September, General Carter, in discussing terms of what would be necessary if a complete SA-2 defense would make use of the U-2 extremely hazardous if not impossible, again stated a desire RE -i0l's over Cuba. He also said that he thought use of a eopirone over Cuba could be justified to the Special Group, "adding? e cannot put a stop to collection; otherwise, the President would never know when the point of decision was reached.'! At this meeting, USIB also approved NIE 85-3. ,