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Neo ee ee an a -aaee ke ae his staff. But no action was ever taken, and the situation remained as described for the duration of the project. 19. WH/4 and DPD did not even agree on doctrine and tech- niques. In addition, all flight plans had to be personally reviewed and approved by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) and by the 5412 Special Group. The requests for.air drops came from Cuba by radio, secret writing or telephone to Miami and then were forwarded to WH/4 headquarters, which then put in an opera- tional request to DPD, which in turn directed the Guatemala air base to mount the flight after approval had been given by DDCI. DPD could and did release its own cables, without coordination. 20. This cumbersome system was complicated even more by the scarcity of agent radio operators inside Cuba. Some of the arrange- ments had to be made by secret writing, which was not only slow but contributed to misunderstanding. Necessary last-minute changes of plan by the reception groups or air crews could not be communicated to each other. Example of Confusion 21. The drop finally accomplished on 30 December is an out- standing example of the confusion that prevailed, 22. WH/4 informed Havana that the drop would be made from 4OO feet. DPD told the Guatemala Trse that the drop would be at 1,000 feet. Guatemala, on the other hand, felt that 600 feet would be best. WH/4 informed the agents that the aircraft definitely - lok -