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ent a AE ee a al 13. The President was further informed that an effective intelligence and action organization inside Cuba, responsive to direction by the exile opposition, could probably be created within 60 days and that preparations for the development of an adequate paramilitary force would require "a minimm of six months and probably closer to eight." Policy Discussions 14, Discussion at high pplicy levels of the Government had preceded submission of this progran to the President. In the last months of 1959 the Special Group, composed of representatives of . several departments and agencies and charged by NSC 5412 with . responsibility for policy approval of major covert action opera- tions, considered several Agency proposals for exile broadcasts to Cuba. During Jamuary and February of 1960 the Director of Central Intelligence informed the Special Group of Agency planning with regard to Cuba, and on 14 March an entire meeting was devoted to discussion of the Agency's program. .Concern was expressed over the length of time required to get trained Cuban exiles into action, and there was discussion of U.S. capabilities for immediate overt action if required. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is reported to have said that forces totaling 50,000 men were ready if needed and that the first of them could be airborne within four hours after receipt of orders. Members of the group urged early formation of an exile junta. The Agency announced its