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FH Reel of the militia. No definitive conclusions can be advanced but it must be remembered that the majority of the militia are not fighters by instinct or packground and are ‘not militiamen by their ow choige. Their training has been slight and they have never been exposed to actual fire (particularly any heavy fire power) nor to air attack. Moreover, the instabilities within Cuba are such that if . - XN _ the tide shifts against. the regime, the chances are strong that substantial numbers will desert: or: change sides, © -b. There is no doubt that the paramilitary ‘foree.would be widely assumed to be U. S. supported. Nevertheless, this conclusion would be difficult to prove and the scale of its activity would not be inconsistent with the potentialities for support by private Cuban and American groups rather than by the U. S. Government. It must be emphasiked> moreover,” that this enterprise would have nothing in common (as would the use of U. S. military forces) with the Russian suppression . of Hungary or the Chinese suppression of the Tibetans. This would be a force of dissident Cubans with Cuban political and military leadership. ce. There would be adverse political repercussions to a landing in force but it is not clear how serious these would be. Most Latin American Governments would at least privately