◆ SpookStack

. _ @ . tee peed RS TO 41. Late September 1960 saw the almost simultaneous oceur- rence of the first maritime operation and the first air drop over Cuba. The former was successful. The latter, the first of a series of failures, resulted in the capture and execution of a paramilitary agent on whom the project had set great store. Maritime Operations 42, Several successful maritime operations took place during make them almost impossible. But the project had only one boat regularly available during this period, and the process of supply- ing and building up a resistance movement through clandestine means began to seem intolerably slow, especially since during this same period Castro's army was reported to have been strengthened with 30 to ho thousand tons of Bloc arms, and Cuban internal security was being tightened. 43, The strike force concept which, as noted, had already begun to be associated with the project as early as July, began to play an ever greater role in WH/4 planning. This role became dominant in September 1960 with the assignment to the project, as chief of its Paramilitary Staff, of a Marine Corps colonel experienced in amphibious operations. 4h. In late October the Nicaraguan Government offered the Agency the use of an air strip and docking facilities at Puerto Cabezas, some 250 miles closer to Cuba than the facilities in