◆ SpookStack

A ee ane coe BO 2 — ae a 6. Three further extraordinary factors must be mentioned: (1) The Chief of Operations of the Clandestine Services (COPS), who is the DD/P's chief staff advisor on clandestine operations, played only a very minor part in the project. on at least two occasions COPS was given express warn- ing that the project was being perilously mismanaged, but he declined to involve himself with the project. (2) The three Senior Staffs, the Agency's top-level | technical advisors in their respective areas, were not consulted fully, either at the important formative stages of the’ project or even after grave operational difficulties had begun to develop; instead, they allowed themselves to be more or less ignored by the chief of the project and his principal assistants. This state of affairs is partly attributable to the inadequate managerial skill and the lack of experience in clandestine pare ~ - military operations of. the WH/4 chiefs; -it was not corrected by the DD/P or his deputy or by the Chief of WH Division. (3) There was no review of the project by the Agency's Project Review Committee, which would at least have allowed the views of the most senior review body in the Agency to be heard. . | Independence of DPD 7. Still another important factor in the diffusion of direction and control was the insistence of the Agency's air arm, the Development Projects Division (DPD), on preserving