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a ak a ~~ 2a ee complete cooperation of the local FBI, the Border Patrol, Inmi- gration, Coast Guard, FCC, Customs, Navy, and police officials. 7. Except for the Director of Central Intelligence, who visited the base, top Agency officials concerned with the project did not have first-hand knowledge of what was being done and what could be done at Miami. The limitations they placed on base activities had serious consequences. For example, when the resistance organizers being trained in Guatemala were ready to go into Cuba in September, the maritime capability to in- filtrate them did not yet exist. By the time the base had built up some capabilities in various lines, valuable months had been lost. The Miami View 8. On the other hand, there was a general feeling at the base that it should be a "station", conducting operations just as Havana was able to do (up to the date when diplomatic rela- tions were broken off), with Headquarters providing support, guidance and policy. This view failed to realize that a station with several hundred people would have been very difficult to conceal, that it would have cost a million dollars to move everyone to Miami, and that Headquarters would have gotten into the operations anyhow, due to the easy access to Miami from Washington, especially by telephone. 9. The letter of instructions to the base chief, dated 6 October 1960, was pretty vague. It stated that he would have -6-