◆ SpookStack

judged to be too short for the B- 6 operation.* Another significant difference between the TRINI- DAD and the ZAPATA air strike plans was that TRINIDAD anticipated the use of six US pilots, each in a B-26 which was scheduled to strike one or another of the fields on which Castro's combat aircraft were stationed. The ZAPATA plan ma21e no such provision for US airmen, and as has been pointed out previously, the use of US pilots was a point of considerable contention between Headquarters and the field -- and in Washington between CIA and State/White House air experts throughout the course of the training activities at JMADD and at JMI'IDE. 1/ In planning for tactical air operations, the question was raised of the need for the number soften- ing, pre-D-Day strike (or strikes) prior to the actual day of the invasion. During meetings of the Special * The B-26 pilots had been training on 5,000 - 6,000 foot strips at both JMADD and JMTIDE; and, as noted later in this volume, during final training, the can- . didates for flying the B-26's into Playa Giron were practicing landings between the two white strips 4,000 feet apart on the runways at JMTIDE and JMADD. The author has been unsuccessful in attempts to discover why no serious protest appears to have been made over the rejection of Trinidad on the basis of the airstri~~__~ ~ field was 4,~OO'xl&o'.~M~n ~l:/w o.k)-t<;. l\/\-t-t-J:'V-!M<1 u..<. r.4-~ ~ ('-y<4..~ c (,.t-~ ('ito. --v<t.A:...li..! -r l~ w ;)..~-~.;; -f-b-:t ~ -~ ~J-~J ~.p, <,-vi ~ ~ tZj-J. l'fbl - - - I ~ ,r.-' ; u; - 178 - -l(, :.j c:,-v .f.-u.1. I~ - A),<J-, fw-tJ ,,-u..... ~..-...--- ~ . r - - ~~A/.Iv ~_ :;10~~7,,,-;~ TO~ ~ET .~, --,..c ~,~ ~, -'