◆ SpookStack

needed. In other words, whatever damage we could do -- we were hoping for some- thing around 50% -- if we could knock out 50% on that strike, then when we went in with our morning strike, just a couple of days later, we could be more sure of getting everything that could hurt the ground troops and the ships. The timing was arranged that closely to the actual landing because it would keep -- the short period of time -- would keep the analysis of the overall damage from being complete by the time the total invasion occurred. We were going to hit three, not one ..• which would purportedly have been his act [the notional defector]. We are going to hit three bases [Libertad, San Antonio, and Santiago] .....•....••• I think there were several of us that thought that we needed a little bit more of an edge than putting all our eggs in one basket for that one strike to be to- tally successful. I was one of the people who was apprehensive about trying to guarantee 100% success with one effort, and I think that the discussion among us ••. we sort of .•. this decision evolved. ~/ Gaines's opinion is supported by Stan Beerli, who was the Acting Chief of DPD, durin~ the course of Project JMATE. Beerli, for example, noted: I think we determined that ••• if we could have an air strike on D-2, and then follow it up with an air strike after we had an assessment, that we could accomplish the air control mission. But, we would like to have had an air strike ... maybe we wanted air strikes .•. maybe - 184 -