◆ SpookStack

2. Strike crews were debriefed separately and had no opportunity to collaborate on each other's assessment. Yet, under separate debriefing, crews verified what other crews on same target had said. 41/* The best source for bomb damage assessment con- cerning D-2 strike came from the Cubans -- particularly from Castro himself. Based on Castro's own statements of 23 April 1961, when he appeared on the "People's University" TV broadcast in Havana before a live audience and told the story of the Bay of Pigs, it appears that the TIDE assessment of the damage was more accurate than was revealed through the photo- graphic intelligence available from the U-2 flights. On 17 April the photography showed four T-33's, 13 B-26's, and two Sea Furies at San Antonio de los Banos. 42/ On that date, Castro claimed that his Air Force had at its disposal two jets, two Sea Furies, and two B-26'sj but according to the Chief of the Revolutionary Air Force, Capt. Raul Curbelo Morales, the situation was even worse than had been painted * Appendix 6 provides examples of the cable traffic received in Headquarters following the return of the B-26's from the D-2 strike. - 211 -