◆ SpookStack

Francis Plimpton, Charlie Yost, and Charlie Noyes. Although Stevenson did not know me well, we had known each other slightly for a good twenty years, and there was no doubt in his mind as to my association with CIA -- in fact, the briefing had been announced to him as a CIA briefing. rtold him about the then status of the operation in detail. I also explained to him that as of this date~ it was impossible to state whether or not~ such an operation would ever take place~ since the final decision was entirely in the President's hands~ and he had not yet made up his mind. I did state that the President had called a meeting for 12 April, for another review of the entire matter, and it was possible that he would announce a decision after, or shortly following, this meeting. My recollection is that I did not mention to Stevenson the air raid which occurred on Saturday, 15 April, since this plan, as I recollect it, was not worked out until after the briefing. I did,however, explain to him in some detail not only the essentiality of achieving the control of the air, but also a number of the air proposals which had been made, including those which had as of 8 April, been t~rned down. If it is important, I could check the matter of the 15 April raid. If my recollection is faulty and the plan for this raid ~ad been completed on 8 April, I would have told it to Stevenson, since I told him all the significant aspects of the invasionpl~ns then in effect, or under consideration ••. Stevenson~ a week later~ following the l5 April raid sent a message to the Secretary of state and the DCI~ saying that I had given him an inaccurate assurance on one point~ i.e.~ that no invasion would occur while the Cuban matter was before the UN. What I did say~ was that no invasion would occur - 242 -