◆ SpookStack

Bundy. He notified me that we would not be permitted to launch air strikes the next morning until they could be conducted from a strip within the beachhead. Any further consultation regarding this matter should be with the Secretary of State. 2. I called the Secretary and asked him if I could come immediately to his office.and discuss this decision. Mr. Bissell joined me at the Secretary's office where we both arrived at about 10:15 p.m. 3. The Secretary informed us that there were political considerations preventing the planned air strikes before the beach- head airfield was in our hands and usable. The air strikes on D-2 had been allowed because of military considerations. Polit- ical requirements at the present time were overriding. The main consideration involved the situation at the United Nations. The Secretary described Ambassador Stevenson's attitude in some detail. Ambassador Steven- son had insisted essentially that the air strikes would make it absolutely impossible for the U. S. position to be sustained. The Secretary stated that such a result was unacceptable. 4. In the light of this he asked that we describe the implications of the deci- , sion. We told him that the time was such (now almost 11:00 p.m.) that it was now physically impossible to stop the over-all landing operation as the convoy was at that time just about beginning to put the first boat ashore, and that failure to make air strikes in the immediate beachhead area the first thing in the morning (D-Day) would clearly be disastrous. I informed him that there would be four effects of - 269 -