◆ SpookStack

~ET regarded the second strike as of marginal importance.* Without it, they had indicated probable loss of vessels and defeat of the invasion force -- hardly minor con- siderations. McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's National Security Adviser, too, submitted some interesting com- ments to the Taylor Committee concerning the cancella- tion of the D-Day strike.** After initially emphasizing that "it was clearly understood that the air battle should be won," Bundy subsequently commented that: * Apparently Rusk was out of communication with Thomas Mann, one of State's principals throughout the Bay of Pigs planning. While often at odds with Agency personnel on details of the operation, Mann has claimed to have been a strong proponent of control of the air over Cuba: [The Zapata plan] was based on the assumption that we would be able to con- trol the air. We would have complete control of the air .•. It was clear that control of the air was of the essence. In fact, the plan called for a standby of our own [US] planes in case anything went wrong ... 116a/ ** Bundy was apparently more perceptive about the accuracy or completeness of the official record than other of the witnesses before the Committee because he forwarded a memorandum with his own version of what he had told the Committee on 1 May 1961 in lieu of the non-verbatim record being made by the Committee secretary. - 276 -