◆ SpookStack

plan. I pointed out that it was most unlikely that all these favorable re- sults would ensue -- in fact it would be a miracle if they did. As to holding the beachhead after an assumed success- ful landing, this was dependent upon friendly control of the air over the beachhead. Air control was necessary for our B-26 aircraft (slow piston-engined) to be able to render close battlefield support in the beachhead. This close support was particularly necessary by virtue of the fact that there was only a small amount of artillery and armor in the landing force and the B-26's had to substitute for them. The B-26's also had to interdict the movement of enemy rein- forcements and weapons to the beachhead by land. The B-26's had as well to hold off enemy reinforcements coming by sea, and prevent enemy sea bombardment, in view of the fact that there was no friendly naval combat support. I pointed out that, in view of the fact that we had no friendly fighter air- craft to cover the beachhead (none could be based within range), the only way we could get air superiority over the beach- head was to catch the enemy fighters on the ground by the strike just cancelled. All my arguments were directed at the implications of the air strike cancella- tion to the success of the military phases of the operation. These arguments were to no avail, however. because actions required for'the success of the military operation, that is the establishment and holding of the beachhead, were no longer the issue. The only issue now was the fact that the air strike was judged to be politically - 291 -