◆ SpookStack

decision in the Fall of 1975, Bissell stated: It was entirely logical to keep the rest of the DPD operation that wasn't related to the Cubans off elsewhere .... Given the need for an air arm to-the Cuban operation -- which meant recruiting and providing for the training of Cuban aircrews, obtaining the B-26's and all other equipment, establishing chains of command and control, assigning opera- tions officers, and the whole business of creating an air capability -- why use DPD for that? Now I think the answer is that DPD had, over the years, a great deal of experience; and I think had developed a very major capability to per- form just that kind of task -- that is, to create an operational capability in- cluding training, acquisition through deniable channels of equipment, [and] relations with the Air Force involved in this kind of task. So I think in that sense, it was natural to turn to the top echelons of DPD to have the operational air arm. Now .•. why was not Col. Beerli made subordinate to Col. Hawkins for the Cuban operation? I think my memorandum [of 12 October 1960] probably states them more persuasively and with more detail -- a great deal more than I could from memory today. But having said t4at, I want to make two other remarks in hindsight •... The first remark is that I think that my judgment in response to what I have dis- tinguished as two different questions .•.. Why use DPD as the organization to build an air capability, and secondly, in that capacity why not subordinate it to Hawkins. I think my decision on both of those matters was almost certainly influenced by my long association with, and loyalty to DPD and very high regard for the people that operated it. In other words, I think I was prejudiced, if you will, in favor of the DPD .... 13 -