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B-26's which would require maintenance and supply support for a period of 120 days from 30 March 1961. 54/* Problems of acquisition notwithstanding, there was no question in the minds of the men most closely associated with air operations -- Stan Beerli, George Gaines, Gar Thorsrud, and Billy Campbell -- that the B-26 was the best possible aircraft that could have been acquired for the operation intended. George Gaines, DPD's Chief of Air Operations for JMATE, was most emphatic in his defense of the B-26. He noted that even when the operation still was planned to be one of guerrilla warfare, there were to be combat aircraft on call; and Gaines went on to say that, if possible, they wanted to use the same type of air- craft that the Cuban Air Force had. When queried about the initial attempts to get the AD-5 t s rather than * It is not clear whether the Air Force failed to , deliver the B-26's at the time that they were re- quested by Jake Esterline, or whether the 16 rather than 18 total to be supported represents the loss of two B-26's during training operations. Whatever the number, DPD had apparently given serious consideration -- as they had in the summer of 1960 -- to recalling some B-26's from the Far East for use in JMATE, but this transfer apparently did not take place. However, on the last day of March 1961, Mr. Bissell did order Col. Beerli to attempt to get an additional two combat-,' ready B-26's assigned to Eglin on an alert basis. 54a/ - 44 -