◆ SpookStack

.J:Op 3 EC R~T The President concluded the meeting, by saying that he would like to urge caution with respect to the danger of making false moves, with the result' of starting some- thing before we were ready for it.* 93/ One of the most persistent problems which was to surface by early fall of 1960 concerned the need for the anti-Castro operation itself, and the bulk of the questioning came from the Department of State, principally from Thomas Mann, who soon was to become the Assistant Secretary of State for American Repub- 1ic Affairs. Mann already had been involved in some of the prior discussions concerning the anti-Castro activity in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for * In his memorandum of a meeting with the President on 17 August 1960, Gordon Gray noted that in discuss- ing the CIA meeting planned for 18 August, that in addition to Messrs. Dulles and Bissell, a third CIA officer might possibly be in attendance; and he also noted that the Vice-President had been invited to at- tend the briefing. According to Gray's record, how- ever~ neither the Vice-President nor the third CIA representative were in attendance at the briefing of 18 August. The attendance of the Director and Mr. Bissell, but with no CIA representative fromWH/4, was further illustration of Jake Esterline's criticism that at too many high level briefings, CIA's repre- sentatives were individuals who, high ranks notwith- standing, were the furthest from the operation -- yet they were responsible for informing the nation's policy- makers about the details of the anti-Castro program. 94/ It is also interesting to note that thisoff-the- record meeting which was arranged by Gordon Gray lasted only 23 minutes, and this included at least a short time for a brief discussion related to Francis Gary' Powers. 95/ - 110 -