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;;FO~ SECR£ r 2. The responsible Departments and Agencies should keep current plans to deal promptly with likely contingencies which might develop with respect to Cuba, especially those involving the safety of us citizens in the Guantanamo Base. 3. Tpe developments with regard to the situation in Cuba should be reviewed by the Council each meeting, for the immediate future. 39/ Subsequent to the NSC meeting of 10 March 1960, . Gordon Gray informed the President that the Special Group had set aside a 2-hour session on 14 March ··to discuss the whole range of assets and possibilities in Cuba." 40/ Prior to the 14 March meeting, Messrs. Bissell and King received a somewhat strange memorandum from Allen W. Dulles offering ··some· suggestions as to possible added 'starters' for our Cuban paper; use your own judgment as to adding them. II 41/ Among these starters was Dulles's suggestion that the International Transport Union somehow be induced to refuse to load , "dangerous" munitions intended for Cuba and then Dulles made the following rather unusual suggestion:* * In addition to the International Transport Union, Dulles also suggested that an attempt be made to in- duce Cuban laborers to resist unloading explosives that were sent to Cuba, but as he himself pointed out, Castro probably would use the Cuban Army should the dockworkers refuse to do the unloading. - 65 - ,