◆ SpookStack

The situation was complicated by the fact that Washington was sitting on its hands waiting for a policy decision to implement the operational phase of JMTIDE; and this was further complicated by the ques- tion of the utilization of US military personnel at the Nicaragua base. As pointed out in the discussion of the Agency's relationships with the Government of Guatemala,* Jake Esterline had been forced to negotiate an agreement which, in effect, was a status of Forces Agreement with the Government of Guatemala before permission was granted for the use of us Army Special Forces personnel at the ground training base, JMTRAV. When it was time to consider the initiation of opera- tions at Puerto Cabezas, the question of utilization of us personnel in a foreign area again came up. In early March 1961, a memorandum to the DDP from the Assistant Director for Operations, Office of Special Operations, Department of Defense, stated in part: The services and the Joint Staff have all reaffirmed that the Department of De- fense policy established for Guatemala must apply to Nicaragua in the same manner. This subject has been discussed with the * See Part I of this volume, pp. 57 ff. - 1~7L TOP jCRET