◆ SpookStack

Part III Conclusions In the instances of both Guatemala and Nicaragua from the Spring of 1960 until the Spring of 1961, it has been shown that Agency personnel involved in Proj- ect JMATE were the principal figures in the on-going relations between those countries and the US Govern- ment. In the instance of Guatemala, the US Ambassador for all practical purposes became "inoperative"; and in Nicaragua the opposite condition prevailed -- any- thing that the Agency suggested received ambassadorial blessing. Neither extreme was desirable; and in both instances what the Chief Executive of each country most wished to avoid -- that it become known that his country provide a base for the anti-Castro Cubans became unavoidable. That the relationship between each nation and the US could be "plausibly denied" when the concept of the anti-Castro plan shifted from guerrilla type operations to invasion. was a snare and delusion. That the White House and the Department of State were prayerful that the USG would not be criticized by the UN or the GAS -14/ TOPpCRET