◆ SpookStack

and he was also rece1v1ng a large inflow of Soviet arms. Further, it should be pointed out that when we talked about the possibility of failure we talked about far more disastrous results than actually occurred. For example, we had discussed the possibility of such things as being ousted from the OAS or censure by the UN, and lively and adverse reaction by our allies in Europe. The results that developed were not as serious as those that we had considered. ·91/* The implication of the above statement that Secretary Rusk had positive views about the planned operation is in sharp contradiction to the opinion of Thomas Mann, who had recently requested reassignment from his position as Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs. Mr. Mann, despite contrary views held by some CIA participants that he was against the operation (~n opinion not held by either DDP Bissell or project chief Esterline), was an unequivocal supporter of the plan to oust Castro. He emphasized the "last chancen aspect of the effort in light of Castro's increasingly success-ful repression of dissidents, and he stressed the danger of the export of revolutionary government to other Caribbean countries. Mr. Mann has stated that he asked to be relieved from ARA earlier than planned because: * Emphasis by writer. 95