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Projects Division of CIA and who became the air operations officer for the WH/4 task force at Headquarters. The primary concern of the committee with reference to Colonel Germosen was whether the T-33s were considered to be a threat, and if they were. a threat, whether they had been selected specifically as air targets during the 0-2 or planned D-Day air strikes. Colonel Germosen's testimony was quite direct; he apparently was quite self-composed in stating that there were no in- structions for the pilots to go after T-33s in particular. The instructions for 0-2 were to knock out all offensive aircraft photographed in the parking areas of the three selected airfields. Colonel Germosen also refuted the testimony of I IWhO had told the committee that the B-26s in Castro's inventory were of far more concern than the T-33s. Colonel Germosen pointed out that Castro's T-33 inventory was located at the three airfields selected for attack on 0-2; and he told the committee that of Castro's five T-33s, three were knocked out by the 0-2 strikes, but one of these was back. in the action by 0+1 (18 April 1961). When queried about the origin of the 0-2 strike, the officer had to plead ignorance. After he indicated some reservations about the wisdom of the 0-2 strike, one committee member took a cheap shot at Colonel Germosen by saying "I have real doubt in my mind as to whether you did well by accepting those other 118/* D-2 strikes." * The record does read " •••other 0-2 strikes," but there was only one 0-2 strike at three airfields. It was not Germosen's respon- sibility "to accept" or not accept the 0-2 strike plan. 125 ;j