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you would have volunteered your doubts, isn't that right?" 135/ To which Admiral Burke again replied, "Yes." When Admiral Burke was asked, "What about the air plan which turned out to be critically weak? Did you make any special judgment of the adequacy of the air plan?" Admiral Burke responded that: "In the early days of this plan I didn~t think the {anti-Castro] Cuban Air Force was This non-responsive answer prompted another inquiry regarding the extent to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had studied the overall plan of the operation, particularly the merits of the 0-2 and D-Day air strikes. Admiral Burke, like the other members of the Joint Chiefs, said he was more impressed by the political importance of the D-2 strike than by what it might achieve in the way of destruction of Castro's air force. He, too, emphasized that the D-Day 137/ strike was intended to keep Castro's Air Force on the ground. Again, however, there was a sharp difference between the intent of those who planned the D-2 air strike and what the Joint Chiefs envisioned as the rationale for the strike. Certainly Messers. Bundy, Hawkins, Esterline, and Bissell intended the D-2 air strike as insurance to guarantee the destruction of 145