◆ SpookStack

attack, to destroy the remaining Castro aircraft at night [on 17/ D-Day and 0+1] on the ground." -- The suggestion that it took the shooting gallery o~er Playa Giron on D-Day to impress the CIA leadership with the necessity of eliminating the T-33s was absurd. Gar Teegen, Chief, Air Operations at Puerto Cabezas had requested authorization for a restrike on the airfields during the late afternoon of D-l; but Teegen request already had been received and rejected by Washington prior to the time that Kennedy made his arbitrary decision to cancel the D-Day strikes. * Memorandum No. 1 of the Taylor Committee Report then related the story of the action at Red and Blue beaches during the course of D-Day, D+l, and D+2. The thrust of the story was that the heaviest casualties inflicted on the Castro forces resulted from B-26 attacks on D-Day and 0+1, and specific reference was made to the air action on the afternoon of D+l which was led by Ar.:\erican contract pilots. In reporting on the extent of the casulties caused by the B-26 attacks, the committee accepted the grossly exaggerated figures that had been presented during the initial CSG meeting.** * The reader might recall that the original air plan called for all out air strike on both the morning and afternoon of D~2 and D-Day and subsequently as required. ** ~lthough President Kennedy initially cancelled all D-Day air strikes, he and Rusk finally agreed to permit the B-26s to fly ground support actions in the immediate area of Red and Blue Beaches on D-Day. Attack against any of the targets originally scheduled for D-Day was specifically prohibited. 194