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an advance CIA command post on board. II What this suggestion ignored was the presence of the US carrier task force in the immediate area with. a CIA liaison officer aboard the flagship, and there were never any questions raised during the course of the conunitte.e he.arings on the failure by either CIA or DOD to suggest that the flagship of the USN task force should have been made the C.I.C. either before, or imMediately after, D-2. causes of failure., was one with which no one involved in the Bay of Pigs operation would disagree--the United States Government was not organizationally prepared to handle a pararni~itary operation on this scale. It is correctly pointed out that there was no single authority short of the President \~ho could have coordinated the actions of CIA, Defense, State, and the USIA.* *For wha.tever reason, the committee did not follow up on the possibility that the failure of the D-2 diversionary landing planned for Oriente Province east of Guantanamo by Nino Diaz had contributed to the failure at Zapata. This speculation had been made in Memorandum No.1, but was ignored as a con- tributing factor here.. 27/ Considering that the committee suggested that the diversionary landing failed "because of weak leadership on the part of the Cuban officer," it was unfortunate that no investigation was made regarding the selection of Diaz. In late January 1961, a report from the infantry training base in Guatemala indicated that Diaz was well known to all trainees as a blowhard agitator and troublemaker and he was not desired as brigade trainee. A former COB claimed that his protests to WH/4 that Diaz was a loser and incapable of leading the diversionary landing were ignored. Howard Hunt, whose perception of the caliber of the anti-Castro Cubans was quite good, had nothing favorable to say about Diaz; and his remarks irnplie.d his concern about the choice of Diaz. ~/ ""07 }. ,:.. , ',~