◆ SpookStack

Because of the relationship of air operations to the success of the project, it is disturbing to note the manner in which Taylor viewed the issue: The evidence left no doubt about the inadequacy of the air support of the beachhead and the disastrous consequences to the ammunition supply. Failure to control the air was a result of the inadequacy in numbers and quality of the B-26s and the lack of sufficient Cuban pilots to keep the planes over the beachhead. Futhermore, this tiny air force was not allowed to use its full strength against the Castro airfields in the surprise attack on April 15, and had no fighters capable of dealing with Castro's planes, part- icularly the three T-33 jet trainers. Finally, as mentioned previously, on the evening of April 16, President Kennedy canceled the dawn strike scheduled to precede the landing of the Brigade. 1/ ' As specified in an earlier volume of this history there was an adequate number of pilots and an excellent fleet of B-26s available to the Brigade. The inability of this force to support the beachhead traced directly to the failure of the President and his White House advisers to: 1) sanction a major air strike on D-2--only eight aircraft were employed; 2) permit a requested restrike on D-l following the strike on D-2 when it was known that not all of the T-33s and Sea Furies had been hit; and 3) permit the all-out air strike which had been planned for D-Day. Once Castro got his T-33s ana Sea Furies into the air, there was no way that the Brigade B-26s--even with more B-26s and more Cuban pilots--could control the air. As both Admiral Burke and Mr. Dulles pointed out 223