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effectively defended by Dulles or Burke--even though they jointly registered the only official dissent in the course of the committee~s investigation.. Had the President been more concerne.d with a ~horough investigation than with his image, he would have waited at least until all the troops had been returned from the. invasion area or otherwise been accounted for; he. would have eliminated Dulles, Burke, and his brother from considerat~on as members of the committee; and he would have selected a group of "statesmen" with reputations similar to Taylor's for the committee. There. is no question that the report of the Cuban Study Group suffered from the haste with which it was prepared. For all practical purpose.s, the Committee had completed its report by 11 May 1961--less than three weeks from the initia- tion of the project, four days in advance of the date on which the President had requested a preliminary report, and prior to the appearance of Admiral Burke, General Lemnitzer, DCI Dulles, and Jake Esterline as witnesses. Moreover, the CSG failed to call a number of witnesses whose testimony could have contributed significantly to improving the assessment of the operation~ Among CIA personnel in this category were the following: C. Tracy Barnes who, as Bissell's principal deputy, had the closest and most continuous contact with--and input to--the project of anyone outside of liH/4. Barnes had been responsible for the controversial 8 April 1961 briefing of Adlai Stevenson about the operation. • See page 205. 232