◆ SpookStack

amounts of U.S. air power over a considerable period of time would have given the necessary cover to permit a retreat into the Escambray. It was the President's opinion that the operation was doomed to defeat and the fact that an air strike was not forthcoming at a particular hour. or day probably hastened the defeat but would not have made the difference between success and failure. 12/* Secretary Rusk, with the President, was the other individual most responsible for the political alterations that ruled out implementation of the Agency's Trinidad Plan--which was favored at all times by the Joint Chiefs of Staff--and for cancellation of the D-Day air strike. As indicated in the discussion of his testimony before the Taylor Committee, Rusk found no fault with his own performance, but his dissimulative remarks about the judgments and performance of others not only shaded the truth but were demonstrably in error. As with Rebert Kennedy, Secretary Rusk would subsequently continue to provide dis- in~~Tm~tion about the Agency's estimates and the importance of the air operations. Secretary of Defense McNamara's opinions could have had a significant impact on the planning of the anti-Castro operation, particularly if he had studied the two JCSM's which seem to have disappeared from sight after having been sent to his office.~~ ~Questions regarding the importance of the cancelled air strike on D-Day were ones about which the Attorney General would continue to be most protective of the President--even to the point of dis- ingenuousness. This topic is discussed in detail in Volume I of this history (pp. 295-305). **The papers were JCSM-44-6l, 27 Jan 61, "US Plan of Action in Cuba," and JCSM-166-t51, 15 Mar 61, "Evaluation of the Mil i tary Aspects of AlternAte Concepts, CIA paramilitary Plan, Cuba." 245