◆ SpookStack

Appendix A Topics for Tuesday [25 April 1961?] 1. Was there any doubt about the necessity of some such military action against Castro? 2. What was the estimate of the probability of success of ZAPATA before D-Day? 3. What was the feeling of likelihood of a popUlar upr~s~ng following the landing? How essential was such an uprIsIng regarded for the success of the operation? How rapid a reaction was expected by Castro? 4. What was expected to happen if the landing force effected a successful lodgment but there was no uprising? 5. What was the understanding of the position of the JCS as to ZAPATA? Was it appreciated that they favored TRINIDAD over ZAPATA? What did the President expect from the Chiefs? 6. Was it understood that control of the air was considered essential to the success of the landing? 7. What were the circumstances surrounding the cancellation of the D-Day air strikes? How serious was the ~e~i~ion viewed? What was the understanding about prelanding strikes? 8. What was the understanding as to the ability of the landing force to pass to a guerrilla status in an emergency? To what extent did this factor influence approval of the operation? 9. What was the understanding of the ammunition situation by the end of April l8? 10. What degree of non-attribution was sought and why? Were the operational disadvantages arising from some of the restrictions imposed by the efforts to achieve non-attribution clearly presented and understood? 11. To what extent did the CIA operations representatives have to "sell" the operation to the other agencies of government? Was any consideration given to transferring the operation to Defense? 254