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and conditions under which carrier aircraft could engage un- friendly aircraft. Beginning on D-Day (17 April 1961) Navy aircraft were in evidence in the invasion areas. In strict conformity with the ~ules, the USN jets made no effort to deter Castro's aircraft, even as Brigade aircraft were being shot down and its ships sunk at the. Bay of Pigs. With the heavy losses of Brigade aircraft on 17 April, CIA·s air commander at Puerto Cabezas began to ,.. appea·:l for immediate support from the jet aircraft aboard the - Essex. Before noon on 18 April, both Gar Teegen, the CIA air chief in Nicaragua, and McGeorge Bundy, the President's national security adviser, were urging their respective chiefs to authorize direct action against Castro's FAR by planes from the carrier-- Teegen's contention being that there was no longer any way of denying US involvement with the invasion. At the White House level, Bundy prepared a memorandum for the President stating: I think you will find at noon Ion 18 April] that the situation in Cuba is not a bit good. The Cuban armed forces are stronger, the popular response is weaker, and our tactical position is feebler than we had hoped. Tanks have done in one beachhead, and the position is precarious at the others. The CIA will press hard for further air help--this time by Navy cover to B-26s attacking the tanks. But I think we can expect other pleas in rapid crescendo, because we are up against a formidable enemy, who is reacting with military know-how and vigor. The immediate request I ~.,ould grant (because it cannot easily be proven against us and because men are in need)•••• In my.own judgment, the right course now is to eliminate the Castro air force, by neutrally- painted .US planes if necessary, and then let the battle go . its way. £/ 277 ¥