◆ SpookStack

concerned the absence of the Navy CAP when the Brigade B-26s were nearing their eIP tCoast in Point) on the morning of 19 April-- even if the planes from Puerto Cabezas arrived earlier than scheduled as claimed by the Navy. In his testimony about the Bay of Pigs before the Taylor Committee, Admiral Clark stated that his orders were for a CAP from 0630R-0730R on 19 April, but: I decided to play this one safe and ordered by people to be on station one-half hour early [0600R] in the event that the CEF [Cuban Expeditionary Force] aircraft made the trip quicker than they had anticipated. However, they ca~e over our ship one hour early [OS30R], and consequently we launched our aircraft immediately. We arrived over the beach area fortv minutes before 0630 Romeo JOSSORJ. However, by that time, the CEF aircraft had already made their strikes and left. 6/ If the Navy CAP was launched and over the beach at the time specified by Admiral Clark in the above testimony, why did the message transmitted from the Task Force to Puerto Cnbezas via Headquarters l128Z [0628R] on 19 April fail to meption that the Brigade's B-26s had already overflown the Essex? If the message at l128Z represented the approximate time of launch of the CAP from the Essex, then the time sequence specified to the Taylor Committee by Clark was grossly in error.* Gar Teegen, the air commander at Puerto Cabezas, had ~elatively little to say about the time problem. In his testimony to General Taylor, in response to the question of whether * The introductory note to Admiral Clark's testimony before the Taylor Committee stated that Clark: "Made the point that all the. orders he had received were good dispatches and clear and that they were carried out fully." 7/ 2 81 -~ I