◆ SpookStack

missions over Cuba; but as the PU Chief stated, it was not until agreement was reached on operations out of Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua that it became feasible to conduct air 11/ operations in support Qf an· invasion effort'. The question of Castro's use of MIG aircraft against the invading forces surfaced again at the second CSG meeting. In this instance, Col. J. C. King, Chief, WH Division, not only was most insistent that MIGs had been in operation over the beach on 19 April 1961, but he even suggested that they had been uncrated and made operational between the time of the 12/ invasion on 17 April and the early morning hours of 19 April.-- Col. Stanley Beerli, the Acting Chief of the Agency's air arm, contributed the first of several errors with his comrr.ent that all of the aircraft lost by the Cuban brigade had been a result of shoot downs by T-33's. At least two B- 26·5 were lost to ground fire and two more to Castro's Sea Furies. During the course of the second meeting of the Cuban Study Group one of the most significant oversights in the story of the Bay of Pigs surfaced, but it was completely ignored by all participants--witnesses and committee members alike. In response to questions by General Taylor about the Agency's preference for the Trinidad rather than the Zapata plan, Col. Hawkins stated: ..., -) ...., . -L....