◆ SpookStack

after I Igave his resume was fori IViews on training and planning for the' air strikes. Just how far J. C. King had been removed from knowledge of and participation in the final operational pla~ning was revealed by King's query: "Why weren't all of the operational aircraft launched 16/* Ion D-2]?" - (The number of aircraft had been limited to give credence to the story that the attack had originated from Cuban airfields by FAR defectors.) Col. Hawkins also interjected questions that led 1 _ into discussions involving matters which were clearly beyond _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 responsibilities. 1 lhowever, unhesitatingly volunteered answers. One such response concerning the possibility of a USN Combat Air Patrol (CAP) during the course of the three-day invasion was precursor to more serious dis- cussions of this sUbject which would come up in subsequent meetings of the Cuban Study Group. Hawkins's questioning of the pilot also permitted Hawkins to interject a reference to an air strike on the afternoon of D+l (18 April 1961) in which two American pilots had participated.** One report said that * More about J. C. King's responsibilities during the course of the planning of the anti-Castro effort appears later in this volume. ** Each of the American pilots had a Cuban copilot and the other four B-26's on the mission had Cuban crews. 36 f'"