◆ SpookStack

at the efficiency and effectiveness of the T-33s. This seems a rather strange response from an individual who was so throughly convinced of the importance of having full control of the air before any troops should be landed on Cuban soil. Even less forgivable than Hawkins's comments were the rema~ks about the T-33s made by Colonel Beerli. In his testimony during the third meeting, the record indicates that Beerli "pointed out that B-26s had been the primary concern and the capability of the T-33s hadn't been appreciated as it wasn't 28/ believed tha.t these aircraft were armed."- While Beerli himself may have lacked knowledge about the T-33s in the in- ventory of Castro's F~R, it was no secret to the Cuban pilot- trainees nor to their US instructors. The Department of Defense was able to supply the Agency's air ops planners with complete information on the T-33s in the Cuban inventory because the US Government had sold them to Cuba, and it was specified that the T-Birds were equipped with two .50 caliber machine guns. As the Agency's senior air operations officer, Beerli certainly should have known this. Discussion of the effectiveness of the T-33s, however, _was after the fact. The more important discussion which occurred during the course of Hawkins's appearance as a witness concerned the cancellation of the planned air strike on D-Day. In early January 1961, Hawkins had written Esterline: I 45 ..... ,.f' ",'