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had received were good dispatches and clear and that they were all carried out fully." Consequently, Admiral Clark's discussion of the combat air patrol (CAP) which A40 jet fighters from the Admiral's carrier, the Essex, was to have provided tor the brigade B-26s on the morning of 0+2 (19 April 1961} followed that line. Clark told that he not only had ordered his CAP to be on' station a half hour earlier than scheduled (i.e., from 0630 - 0730 local time), but also that the brigade aircraft had over- flown the carrier one hour earlier than had been scheduled-- consequently, the A40s were still on the deck. Even though the A40s were then launched they were unable to reach the invasion area in time to protect the B-26s--one of which was shot down by a FAR T-33 and another one was downed by ground fire. According to the Admiralr We arr;j.ved over the beach area 40 minutes before 0630 Romeo. However, by that time the CEF aircraft had . already made their strikes and left. 51/ The failure of the combat air patrol to carry out its mission, therefore, was obviously the fault of the CIA not the USN. No one in attendance. at the seventh meeting saw fit to question Admiral Clark's testimony. In fact, Col. J.C. King-- the almost ever-present CIA representative during the committee meeti.ngs--was asked to check with CIA's air operations people to see what explanation they could offer for "the time discrepancy." 61