◆ SpookStack

What Bundy completely failed to bring into his account was that in JCSM-166-61 (15 March 1961) the Joint Chiefs were on record to the Secr~tary of Defense specifying that Zapata was acceptable, but that Trinidad was best of the plans that had been proposed_ As in the earlier meetings of the Taylor Committee where this issue had been raised, the albatross was once again hun~ around the necks of the Joint Chiefs; and no comment was made about the position, or lack thereof, of the Secretary of Defense. Jnasmuchas there ~s no evidence that the Secretary of Defense ever responded to JCSM-166-61, it is unfortunate that neither the Chairman of the JCS nor any other member of the Joint Chiefs had pushed the Secretary of Defense for a response to that memorandum. It is particularly important because the memorandum specifically requested that the Secretary of Defense support the conclusions that were presented in the memorandum, including the conclusion that "none of the alternative concepts ito Trinidad] are considered as feasible and likely to accomplish the objective as the basic [Trinidad] paramilitary plan." Conceivably, of course, at this relatively early stage of the new administration, the members of the JCS may have been overly intimidated by McNamara's "whiz kid" reputation. 71 .'.' ;;::iij'