◆ SpookStack

74 list were made as as result of pressures from the administration-- including among other deletions the planned strikes against Castro's microwave facilities and a napalm attack on the tank/truck park at Managua. Another of the hard to swallow propositions advanced by Mr. Bundy--and this was straight party line from the White House--was his comment "I specifically endorse the comment attributed to me lin the official record of the seventh meeting of the CSG] that if the military had said at any time that calling off or modifying the air strike would cause the operation to fail--or even damage it severely--the President would have reversed any such decision as that on . ·64/* Sunday." Once again the reader is reminded of the comments which General Cabell made to Secretary of State Dean Rusk. during the course of the 16 April discussion on cancellation of the D-Day strikes. When Secretary Rusk had the President on the other end of the telephone line, Rusk accurately transmitted to the President Cabell's fears that if the strike were cancelled the success of the operation was in serious jeopardy--but to no avail.** * McGeorge Bundy was unquestionably one the of the most loyal of the White House staff. Following the collapse of the invasion at the Bay of Pigs, he offered an undated letter of resignation to President Kennedy to be "accepted at your pleasure at any time." See Appendix B·for a copy. **Perhaps Mr. Bundy did not consider General Cabell, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, sufficiently "military." General Cabell, of course, had an outstanding record as an Air Force officer including extensive combat experience during World War II and planning and intelligence experience, e~en prior to becoming DDCI in 1953. One of the principal activities under General Cabell's jurisdiction when he was Director of USAF intelligence was air target analysis, and General Cabell had been closely associated with such analysis.