◆ SpookStack

~ Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006800050005-6 _ 25X1A | CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCE 25X1A under normal circumstances, will never do anything to promote one or more coups in order to create the downfall of the regime; a military revolution, therefore, would be discounted, since the compactness of the Army is considered by them to count above everything else. However, it is also known that in the event of a direct Soviet threat against Yugoslavia both they and their "comrades" who are faithful to Tito would universally pronounce themselves in favor of the Soviets, stressing the fact that it is primarily necessary to protect the integrity of the Arny, an Army which, all told, is socialistically oriented, 3. Tito and his closest collaborators are perfectly aware of this spirit of mind of the generals, and, through the UDB, exercise surveillance over all the above-mentioned elements but, in substance, adopt no severe measures against them. In the event of a Soviet success, all would automatically cede the leadership of the Army to pro-Russian generals and, on the other hand, in the event of an American victory, the Corps fof Generals would embrace the position of the Yugoslav Chief of Staff, Koca Popovic, according to whom Socialist Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Army could only preserve themselves by leaning upon the West and upon its technicel and material aid. A parvenu of the Communist Party in the Yugoslav Army, that is, General Pero Kosoric, accused Koca Popovic of nationalist deviationism because of the leaders' attitudes in favor of the West. Kosoric and two or three other political generals are above all completely Communist but also officers of the former regime. Popovic energetically defended his attitude, affirming that his line prevents the United States from exploiting nationalist military elements and thus placing Tito's regime in danger. During the above-mentioned political meeting of { May, Popovic stressed that an operational and informational command formed \Y_ of Royalist Yugoslav Army elements had been established in the Department ‘of the Army in Washington. He stated that Colonels Bjelajac, Knezevic, i Novek, Stude, and others were part of this command, but that the command would not only paralyze, but would actually force the United States to iscount any kind of combination with the nationalists since it would be able to count upon the Army of Tito. 4e From the above it can be deducted with certainty that no action will be initiated in any particular direction from within the ranks of Yugoslav generals for the simple reason that they act in such a way as to make the Army remain an orgenic entity in any situation. This state of affairs gives rise to the possibility that all the opposing camps will, under certain specific circumstances, be able to count upon it. Even if no split should take place among the generals with respect to their different political conceptions a certain discord nevertheless does exist among them; they fight each other mutually in order to obtain better positions and a great influence for themselves. At the same time, there is apparent a certain hostility of a regional character which is often observed on the part of the Croat and Slovene generals against the Serbs of whom it is said, as was the practice in the Royalist Yugoslav Army, that they do not allow the key positions of command to slip out of their hands. As far as their economic treatment is concerned the generals find themselves in a privileged position. For example, divisional commanders, who receive special indemnities in addition to their pay, are paid better than ministers of the federative republics. 5. In all, the number of officers previously members of the Royalist Army and presently in the Tito officer corps has been reduced to eight percent. Of this total, four percent consists of old Communists who at a certain determined time were infiltrated into the Royalist Army as Red agents, whereas the resis RUA indispensable specialists who have no command functions. _ Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006800050005-6