◆ SpookStack

ae 1 a Ne a a Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/07 : CIA-RDP87M00539R000901 190016-2 SECR ET A principal objective of Soviet overt and covert collection is scientific and technical (S & T) intelligence. Most Line X officers in the United States seem to establish a broad base of contacts. Among those are official contacts, which are made in connection with the Soviet's official assignment and considered useful for obtaining official policy-type information and background data. Another type of contact is that established in pursuit of ostensible cover duties and from which, in part, is derived the pool of contacts from which a Line X officer will spot candidates for development as agents. Generally, contacts are made by IOs joining professional associations, attending conferences, or contacting research organizations or information brokerage firms. Some of the individual contacts will be further assessed for development. In the process, the Line X officer will ask them for open-source information, to perform research, or possibly to obtain restricted publications. The expulsion of nearly 150 Soviet officials worldwide in 1983 was directed primarily at those engaged in S & T intelligence collection. Many of those expelled, including two from the United States, were KGB Line X officers. These expulsions, even when coupled with strained U. S. - Soviet relations, do not appear to have had a significant effect on Line X activities in the United States. It would seem that there would be a disruptive effect upon SIS operations when a KGB officer is forced to depart unexpectedly, since it frequently requires several months to arrange for a replacement. The FBI has, however, not detected any activity which might be construed as compensating for the expulsion of an officer. This may be explained in part by the fact that the broad S & T requirements can often be satisfied through the acquisition of unclassified information. Furthermore, targeted material can be acquired outside the United States under more favorable operating conditions, or inside the United States by Warsaw Pact intelligence ° services. SECRET -2.- .-.....,~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/07 : CIA-RDP87M00539R000901190016-2