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Approved For Release 2000/08/07 : CIA-RDP96-00788R000100330001-5 SPECIAL EDITION --- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984 NEW YORK TIMES 6 June 1984 Pg. 6 Administration Debating Antiterrorist Measures By LESLIE H. GELB Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, June 5 — Three and a half years after announcing that com- batting terrorism would be President Reagan’s first national-security pnori- ty, officials say a debate on the subject is still going on in the Administration and that it will be taken up at the eco- nomic summit conference this week. The British are said to have drafted a tough statement designed to show that the seven leaders at the meeting that opens Thursday in London are deter- mined to do something about state- sponsored terrorism. Another reason the statement was drafted, according toa key Administration official, is that “They think we're serious about pre- emptive military attacks against coun- tries supporting terrorism and they want to try to head this off.’’ Two months ago, President Reagan signed a two-and-a-half-page decision memorandum that officials called a foundation for a policy but not specific guidelines for action or specific com- mitments of new resources. As described by a range of Admin- stration officials, the document ap- proved on April 3 lists general princi- ples — including efforts to ‘‘dissuade”’ countries from sponsoring terrorism and the right ‘to defend ourselves” if victimized. But there is no discussion of how to do this, and no definition of state-sponsored terrorism. The Dipiomatic Alternative Nor did the document discuss diplo- matic efforts to organize countries against state-sponsored terrorism, as was done a decade ago against hijack- ings, beyond calling for working ‘‘as closely as possible’’ with other nations. Officials said an obstacle to such ef- forts is the fact that many nations are reluctant to jeapordize economic ties with Iran, Syria, Libya and other na- tions, yet want to combat terrorism. Instead, according to the officials, the President’s memorandum raises a whole series of questions for further study — principally, what additional resources are needed to gather intelli- gence on terrorist activities and how the United States should respond to dif- ferent kinds of terrorist attacks. At the conference discussion on the subject, officiais said the British are expected to take the lead. Officials de- scribed the French as hesitant about is- suing a policy statement and the Ital- jans as reluctant to get too deeply in- volved given their important trade relationship with Libya. A senior official, commenting on some Administration-inspired news re- ports that there was now a new policy of taking pre-emptive and punitive ac- tion against terrorists, stated that the policy was essentially not new at all. Cooperation With Other Nations He said all it meant was that known terrorists would be arrested and that Washington should cooperate more with countries that have intelligence on terrorists, such as Britain, West Ger- many and Israel. Officials said the memorandum also stressed doing eveything ‘‘legally.” This word was added to the final docu- ment, according to the sources, even after virtually all those involved in.the interdepartmental study: rejected a recommenda .ion by senior ‘Pentagon officials to authorize ‘‘hit squads’’ to kill terrorists and after the Central In- telligence Agency succeeded in remov- ing any language that might be con- strued as involving it in domestic spying. . Robert C. McFarlane, the national security adviser; Vice Adm. John Poindexter, his deputy, and other sen- ior White House officials were said by knowledgeable officials to have fash- _ ioned the language of the document so that Mr. Reagan could be portrayed as taking strong action without his being committed to anything, especially any- thing that the Democrats in an election year could portray as recklessness. ‘Crossing the Line’ The result, in the view of some in the State Department and the Central In- telligence Agency, is a document that means either ‘‘essentially doing better at what we've already been doing for several years now,’’ as one said, ‘‘or crossing the line at some point with pre-emptive counterforce and military retaliation where hard evidence may ‘be iacking.” The potential for just such actions in “a second Reagan Administration is precisely what makes the document at- tractive to a number of high-ranking Pentagon civilians and several senior officials as well. . In a recent magazine interview, wil- liam J. Casey, Director of Central In- telligence, cited Israeli action in strik- ing back at countries that aid terrorist attacks and continued, ‘I think you will see more of that — retaliation against facilities connected with the country sponsoring the terrorists or retaliation that just hurts the interests of countries which sponsor terrorism.” Issues of Conscience A close associate of Secretary of State George P. Shultz said the Secre- tary was “grappling with his con- science.’ The source said Mr. Shultz was in favor of using force, but was against what he said was the Israeli mode! of retaliating against the inno- _cent along with the guilty. This official said Mr. Shultz’s think- ing and that of the Administration would evolve in response to specific provocations in the future. ‘‘Some ter- rorist action will spark an Administra- tion reaction,” the official said. ; To many officials connnected with this issue, the President’s decision document represents at least a tempo- rary halt to three years of bureaucratic drift and high-level inattention to a problem the Administration leaders initially called their highest priority. Bombings in Lebanon By all accounts, the twin shocks that energized senior officials were the bombings of the American Embassy and the marine compound in Lebanon. The latter was followed by a spate of alarming intelligence reports to the ef- fect that terrorist groups — along with Iranian, Libyan and Syrian leaders — had come to the conclusion that terror- ism was working, that it was the way to break American will. ; Before a terrorist drove an explo- sive-laden truck into the Marine head- quarters at Beirut’s airport, killing 241 Averican servicemen, Congress and the American public were uneasy with the American presence in Lebanon. Af- terward, as officials saw it, the politi- cal pressure to withdraw the marines became irresistible. It was at this point that senior offi- cials focussed on the interdepartmen- ‘tal studies that had been languishing for some time. Achievements Listed Since then, Administration officials maintained that three things have been ‘accomplished: reorganization and new personnel that they hope will strengthen policy formulation and ac- tion; the reaching of an uneasy consen- sus about what is known and not known about the phenomenon of government- supported terrorism, and agreement on a series of small steps to improve coordination against terrorists within the United States and with other coun- tries. Officials said Mr. Shultz would soon name a new Director of the Office for Combatting Terrorism. Robert Oakley, a eareer diplomat and currently Am- bassador to Somalia, will replace Am- bassador Robert M. Sayre, another ca- reer Foreign Service officer. Mr- ‘Shultz is said to hope that Mr. Oakley will energize what has been for many -years a bureaucratic backwater. The office was established about 12 ears ago as a response to a series of international aircraft hijackings and is responsible for coordinating the activi- ties of 26 different Government depart- ments and agencies. In January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff quietly established a new agency to coordinate special forces operations and war plans against terrorists. Called the Joint Special Operations Agency, it is headed by Maj. Gen. Wes- ley H. Rice of the Marine Corps. . The C.1.A.’5 main unit is called the Global Issues Staff. Created about 12 years ago as part of the Administra- tion’s response to hijackings, it is a CONTINUED NEXT PAGE Approved For Release 2000/08/07 : CIA-RDP96-00788R000100330001-5