◆ SpookStack

Approved For Release 2000/08/07 : CIA-RDP96-00788R000100330001-5 SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984 ternational visibility of Washington. It can also legitimize, in some minds, the terrorists’ position. Considering the devastating weapons available, a small band of terrorists can cause extensive death and destruction, making them the great equalizer in con- frontations between superpowers and weaker nations. Because media attention on terrorists is immediate and global, one well-planned act can have tremendous impact. And, points out Kupperman in his report to the Army, there is the matter of America’s inexperience and relative naiveté when it comes to coping with professional terrorists. “This nation, unlike others in the Western alliance, has no internal con- sensus on how to respond . . . and has no common philosophical basis for ac- cepting the high costs, in lives, mate- rials, pride, and power, of occasional failure in dealing with terrorism,’’ he writes. ‘‘We have no internationally rec- ognized commitment to firm retributive deterrence to such violence.’’ Asked what ‘‘no internal consensus on how to respond’’ means, Kupperman cites a lack of coordination and preparedness among military and law-enforcement agencies. To a foreign group aware of these problems, the US becomes a more attractive target. A case in point: To combat the ter- rorism of the Red Brigades, the Italian government formed an anti-terrorist squad, which in 1978 alone tracked down and jailed thousands of suspected ter- rorists. By comparison, it was only re- cently that Ronald Reagan began push- ing for the formation of the FBI and CIA counter-terrorist squads, a proposal that is likely to come under fire in Congress. ‘*Terrorists have not hit us yet because they are afraid,’’ says Pentagon consult- ant Ledeen. ‘“‘But [the US withdrawal from Lebanon] will encourage them. They will draw the conclusion that the best way to get your way with the United States is to kill a certain number of Amer- icans, and after a while, the US does what you want it to do.’’ In a city hit by terrorists, fear can quickly spread outward to friends and co-work- ers of victims. Saul Landau remembers how his life changed in the fall of 1976. Landau had arrived at work one Sep- tember morning when his wife phoned. She told him that on her way down Mas- sachusetts Avenue, she had witnessed the worst accident she had ever seen. “*The car was still smoking. There were still flames, there was blood all over the place, she told me,’’ he recalls. ‘‘She was so upset. I said, ‘Well, I’m sorry. That sounds terrible.’ We hung up.’’ A few minutes later, Landau received acall from the receptionist at the Institute es Pill il a “My guess is you're ing tos ee a bomb against the State Department,” says Dr. Robert Kupperman of the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Assassination attempts against individuals are also likely.” for Policy Studies. What his wife had seen was not an accident, but the after- math of the murder of Landau’s co- workers. The late-model Chevelle in which they were riding was blown up by a radio-detonated bomb as the car reached Sheridan Circle. Letelier’s legs were sheared off in the blast; Moffitt drowned from blood dripping into her lungs. In the days and months following the killings, as the FBI's investigation pro- ceeded, fear stalked the Institute. **I was terrified,’’ says Landau. ‘‘I learned to live with fear. ‘*When I put my key in the ignition sometimes, my hand trembled. I had to use my left hand to steady my right. I had the urge to check my car every day— and my house. Everyone at the Institute was terrified. If they had the audacity to kill in the nation’s capital, half a mile from the White House, what wouldn’t they do? “‘There were other Chileans in the building—they were also exiles—in- cluding Mrs. Letelier. Several people urged the director to get the Chileans out of the building. Some fellows left. One said that when he signed up at the In- stitute, it wasn’t a death trip he had in mind. “T sat with my back to the wall looking at people coming in,’’ Landau continues. ““My sense of peripheral vision im- proved. I’m not saying there was any real danger. But we felt there was. What the bombing told us was that anybody could have been in the front seat with Orlando. It happened to be Ronni Mof- fitt. We had to understand that the mere fact of associating with someone could make you a victim of state terrorism.’’ Landau goes on. ‘‘There were threats, letters and calls— ‘You all deserve what that Commie spy got.’ Click. Like many fellows at the Institute, ] had dreams. People chasing me. I elude all but one. Or my house is surrounded, and I man- age to figure out a way to escape, except there’s always that one person left. “‘The worst dream was right after- wards. It kept recurring. It was of Or- lando as a ventriloquist’s dummy. Sitting on somebody’s legs, flopping. Smiling that dummy smile. Just the mouth open- ing, but no words were coming out.”’ Eight years later, Landau no longer has the dummy dream but says he oc- casionally has the dream about people chasing him. Kirby Jones also learned to live with fear. Today he’s a public-relations man at the World Bank, but in 1975 he was starting Alamar Associates, a firm that introduced American businesses to Cuba. That was also the year he interviewed Fidel Castro for CBS, helped set up George McGovern’s trip to Cuba, and co-authored the book With Fidel. It was also the year the death threats started. ‘‘We’re going to do to you what hap- pened to Ché Guevara,’’ a voice would say. Then the line would go dead. Jones recalls how the FBI advised him to start his car every day. ‘“They told me never to wash my car. If someone plants a bomb on your car, they can’t replace the dirt. So if you have a dirty car, you can more easily check it out at night and in the morning. ‘*They said that when I start the car, I should always have the doors open. Many of the injuries come from con- CONTINUED NEXT PAGE Approved For Release 2000/08/07 : CIA-RBP96-00788R000100330001-5