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Approved For Release 2000/08/07 : CIA-RDP96-00788R000100330001-5 SPECIAL EDITION -- SOLDIER OF FORTUNE July 1984 Pg. 30-35 SOF FEATURE KILLING FOR THE GOLD Olympiad 784: Ominous Parallels to the Munich Massacre by Kevin E. Steele Photos courtesy of AP/Wide World 430 hrs., an hour before dawn. Dark- ness clung like a cloak to the new high-rise buildings that housed the Olym- pic athletes. Eight men, dressed in athletic garb and carrying athletic equipment bags, easily scaled the 6.5-foot security fence. Once on the other side, they quick- ly shouldered the athletic bags that con- tained the instruments of their trade — Soviet assault rifles, handguns and gre- nades — and hurried to meet their appointment with destiny. Gold medals meant nothing to them. Twenty hours later a final body count revealed 17 dead — among them 11 Israeli athletes. Five of the eight terrorists were killed, along with one German policeman. How did this atrocity occur, and why was it allowed to happen? This was the infamous “Munich Mas- sacre,’”’ carried out by the Black Septem- ber faction of the PLO during the 1972 summer Olympic Games in Munich, West Germany. The televised drama that un- folded that September day ranks with the dark days of Dallas in 1963 as a vivid, step-by-step portrayal of murder and mayhem indelibly etched on our con- sciousness. Random and senseless acts of terror continue to this day. The terrorists them- selves are not important, nor are their warped beliefs and perceptions of injus- tice levied against their causes. It matters not what breed of rabid dog bites, only the pain and death that follow. The presence of terror, and the means by which it is inflicted on innocent citizens, should be all that concern us. Why is the Munich Massacre important today, 12 years later? Haven’t we learned how to cope with terrorism? Or are we victims of the complacency bred by the successes at Entebbe, Mogadishu and London? Certainly we know how to com- bat these vile creatures who prey on inno- cent civilians — or do we? Los Angeles is about to host the 23rd Summer Olympiad. What security pre- cautions have been taken to safeguard both the athletes and the spectators, and have the Olympic organizers learned the tragic lessons of Munich? Unfortunately, it seems they haven't. Let’s review the 1972 Olympics and the events that led up to the slaughter at Furstenfeldbruck Airbase, then compare these to the security arrangements made for the L.A. Games. The ominous parallels are all too evident. The West Germans welcomed the 1972 Olympic Games as a chance to set the record straight, and to exorcise the specter raised by the 1936 Games hosted by Adolph Hitler as a propaganda extra- vaganza to prove the invincibility of the Aryan race. TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984 Anew Olympic Village was constructed in Munich (ironically the birthplace of National Socialism) where the athletes could live and compete in the spirit of sportsmanship and harmony. Security precautions were made, to include the 6.5-foot chain-link fence that ringed the village perimeter. Checkpoints were established at all village entrances, and the original intent was to restrict entrance. However, the press complained of these “Gestapo” tactics, and the village was opened for all. (Once again the general Press rears its ugly head.) The police pre- sence was intentionally downplayed. to prevent further references to German “militarism.” The responsibility for village security was under the jurisdiction of the Munich police, under the command of Dr. Manfred Schreiber. An “easy and re- laxed”’ atmosphere prevailed. Eight PLO terrorists quickly infiltrated this ‘‘easy and relaxed” atmosphere with no difficulty as part of the 30,000-worker contingent hired for the games. No back- ground checks were made, and the Arabs did not attempt to hide their national ori- gins. On the morning of 5 September, the eight terrorists disguised as athletes met no resistance scaling the relatively low “security’’ fence. The building that housed the Israeli team was not locked, and when the murder team knocked on the doors of the Israeli apartments they were opened. Only when the barrels of the Kalashnikovs were visible to the Israelis did they expect the worst — and by then it was too late. Within hours the Munich police were aware of the situation and had begun to take action. Under the orders of Schrei- ber, 600 policemen were alerted to cor- don off the area wth armored personnel carriers. A command center was estab- lished a short distance from the Israeli quarters, and Schreiber initiated the first discussion with the terrorist leader. It is at this point that the situation becomes in- teresting, and ultimately tragic. If a single blame can be leveled on the handling of the Munich Massacre, it would have to be placed directly upon the Ger- man officials who allowed disorganization to rule the day. In 1972, there was no GSG-9 (although this debacle was directly responsible for its formation), no SWAT, no Delta Force. The responsibility for the use of force to free the hostages rested on the shoulders of not one but three indi- viduals, their use of the decentralized police/paramilitary apparatus became their worst handicap. Schreiber commanded the Munich municipal police who initially took charge of the situation as it unfolded. Later in the day, Schreiber was supposedly supported CONTINUED NEXT PAGE 26 Approved For Release 2000/08/07 : CIA-RDP96-00788R000100330001-5