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Approved For Release 2000/08/07 : CIA-RDP96-00788R000100330001-5 SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984 25 April 1984 BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN Uncertainty is the best way to terrorize the terrorist By Marvin Leibstone HE anti-terrorism direc- tive sent by President Reagan recently for im- plementation by our dip- lomats, spies and soldiers is vigorous, but will it have much impact? The directive announces, in a straightforward way, that the United States will counter terrorism with pre- and post-operational. strikes against perpetrators ‘targeting Americans. That is, we'll use stop- “em-at-the-pass arid an-eye-for-an- eye measures. The president thus has put the world’s 40-odd terrorist groups on no- tice. He also said earlier this month that America will take neccessary military action to protect citizens here and abroad. However, the policy ignores basic facts about terrorists. For example, few care what any nation’s counter-terror policy might be. Whether we train Green Berets, double the guard or impose sanctions makes little difference to those who use terrorism as a political tool. More than 500 Israeli counterattacks since 1970 have not stopped Palestinians from detonating bombs in Jerusalem. ‘Terrorists, like guerrillas, believe that as long as they can employ vio- lence and scare their enemies into diverting resources, they are winning -even if their side draws more casual- ties. Central to terrorist thinking, then, is faith in Syrian leader Hafez ‘Assad’s notion that Western powers are “short of breath: ” Assad believes he proved the point by sculpting a withdrawal of.U.S. forces from Leba- non with a terrorism agenda. The theory is hardly new. It has roots in perceptions of America’s de- parture from Vietnam, of Jimmy Carter's failed rescue mission in Iran, of the indecision in Washington’s cur- rent Central America policy. Not that we should put aside plans to respond to terrorism with military force. But we should have a better understanding of how militancy af- fects terrorists. Many terrorists delight in having industrial nations. post security guards everywhere and block struc- tures with concertina wire. This is propaganda for recruiting terrorists and for. convincing the non-aligned that America is using Gestapo tactics. And, now that the Reagan admin- istration has, as Secretary of State George Shultz explains, gone from a passive to active anti-terrorist pos- ture, perpetrators are likely to try forcing our hand in ways that can bring us much woe.: Causing governments to overreact militarily has been the most frequent terrorist ploy since the French revolu- tion. In effect, the we-dare-you anti-- terrorism policy invites trouble be- cause it ups the ante. More precisely, it fails to deter because one can’t stop terrorism by putting up warning signs or applying spray as we do when battling insects. Consider the chil- dren and old ‘men sent in waves by Iran against Iraq or the suicide at- tackers of embassies; they keep on coming. And absent from Mr. Reagan’s new policy of pre-emption and repri- sal is the political climate present in, for example, Israel. That country is at war and hence has public support for aggressive action. The Soviet Union rarely experiences terrorism because it does not have free public opinion to hold back the most brutal counter- orce. No democratic nation can operate against the public will or sacrifice ideals to put a stop to terrorist. Therefore the Reagan administration must continue to deal with the prob- lem in more ways than a military response: Neither non-military nor military counter-terror —_actjons should be emphasized at the expéfise of the other. | Prior to the 1979 takeover of our embassy in Tehran, few acts were perpetrated against Americans, mainly because Washington's anti- terror policy was unclear: Perpetra- tors had no idea what the resporise might be and shied away. Not. many terrorists will take a risk against. an unpredictable outcome. Most studies of terrorisin prove that events are calculated to exact a particular response. Hostage-takers know in advance how long some na- tions will negotiate before using force against them. Yet to suggest that no policy is the best policy is unwise. Any formula allowing for the widest range of non- tnilitary as well as miltary choices seems. appropriate. . Another point to consider is that organizations once purely terroristic and now testing legitimate political activity might, if convinced the Unit- ed States intends to apply only’ thili- tary pressure against them, de-eni- phasize the political and return ‘to pure terrdr. ; Perhaps anti-terror policy should evolve from assessments of whatever terrible deed is being confronted ‘at the moment. Certain hostage-tak- ings are answered best via a pafa- trooper assault, others with lengthy negotiation, some by silence. — na But if terrorist acts are a form of - theater, and are started to obtain responses predestined by policy, then that policy is self-defeating. If you tell an anti-social person you will slap him ifheslaps you first, you can count on him slapping you. Keep him in the dark about the consequences of slap- ping and he may not slap anybody. | - We do not owe terrorists the bene-. fit of our thinking. A policy that is comprehensive and allows for any and all sorts of reaction can boorner- ang in our favor — by terrorizing the terrorist with uncertainty. @ Marvin Leibstone writes fre- quently for these pages on national and foreign affairs. Approved For Release 2000/08/07 : ci’Rpp96-00788R000100330001-5