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DIEPRIEN LABERGE Approved For Release 2000/08/08 slightly more lucid dreams than the high-alpha condition; however, this dif. ference was not statistically significant. Addressing this same issue, LaBerge (1980b) performed a Fourier analysis on EEG activity (C3/A1) for a single lucia dream REM period. Comparison of the spectral profiles for the lucid and nop. lucid portions of the REM period revealed alpha activity for the nonlucid portion to more closely resemble the waking EEG spectrum than did that in the lucid portion; however, the two REM samples did not significantly differ. In summary, it would seem that at this point no reliable association of Incig dreaming with alpha activity (whether high or low) has been established. A more productive approach to the question of EEG in lucid versus nonlucid REM would probably involve quantifying whole-band EEG frequency spectra from several electrode placements and comparing signal-verified lucid dreams with nonlucid controls. NREM LUCID DREAMS The findings summarized here indicating that lucid dreams typically occur in REM sleep should not be misconstrued to suggest that lucid dreams never . occur in NREM sleep. In fact, in LaBerge, Nagel, Dement and Zarcone’s initial study (1981), lucid dreams were reported by two subjects after spontaneous awakening from NREM sleep (Stage-2 once; Stage-1, twice). The Stage-2 report indicated only a brief moment of lucidity before awakening; because the subject was unable to signal while lucid we cannot be certain that her experience took place during Stage-2 sleep and not while awakening. As for the NREM Stage-1 reports, although the subject reported signaling before awakening on these occa- sions, no signals could be verified on her polysomnogram. LaBerge (1980a) polysomnographically recorded a single trained subject during sleep onset on 3 consecutive nights. The subject reported a rich history of hypnagogic imagery. On the experimental nights, she made an effort to retain consciousness while entering sleep-onset dream states. ‘‘Dreaming’’ was dis- tinguished from other sleep-onset mentation by the two requirements that (1) the subject was subjectively asleep (i.e., unaware of the actual position of her body in bed) and (2) that she hallucinated her body within the dream scene. On each of the experimental sessions (lasting about 2 hours), the subject repeatedly rested quietly, but vigilantly, and while drifting off to sleep counted to herself (‘‘One, two, three, . . .’’) until she began to dream, at which point she awakened and tape-recorded a mentation report. In 25 of the 42 resultant dream Teports (all of which were very short), the subject claimed to have been lucid. The following is a typical report: ‘‘I am in the grocery store, going down an aisle; only I am standing on a cart. It is whizzing real fast. As 1 go by the Coke and Pepsi bottles, I realize that | am dreaming. I think to look at my hands, but they won’t move up to eye level”’ (p. 101). Note the absence of voluntary control over the body image, a very unusual condition for REM lucid dreams. Visual poyurs :C A-RDP9G PLE REA QN4AQAGd2aNI of these ‘‘dreamlets"’ to have i i nts. during Stage-! sleep, with slow eye moveme cco lot study makes it clear that the observed frequency of NREM lucid me rill depend on experimental demand characteristics. The same point ts oy Dane (1983), who found a high proportion of lucid dream reports mae rom NREM under conditions of heightened attention during sleep onset seelicit instructions that ‘‘dreams occur during NREM as well as during eM yeep" (p. 249). A comparative study of REM versus NREM (and ‘‘wak- ee) lucid dreaming clearly needs to be done. dreamin psyCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL RELATIONSHIPS DURING REM SLEEP One of the major obstacles impeding the development ° human con sciousness aS a topic of rigorous scientific study has been that ¢ re y a ect ount available of the private events occurring in a person’s mind Is her own subjective report. Subjective reports, unfortunately, are not subject to objec tive verification—at least not directly. To make matters worse, of all the ad witnesses’ ’—as Heraclitus catled the senses— ‘‘introspection appears fo pe the least reliable. Introspection is not really even a sense: We do not am yon ok and see” the contents of our minds; what we see”’ there is large y epen av what we expect to see based on our theories of ourselves. These t coe cae rtray ourselves as more consistent and rational than we really are ( is ; Wilson, 1977). Given that the only witness is of uncertain reliability, w at we need in order to study consciousness more objectively is a means of corr . " : ing the testimony of the ‘‘I-witness,”’ and this is precisely the ve ° a psychophysiological approach. A key element in this new strategy is < i ca of making full use of the subject's cooperativeness and intelligence. reat m practice in experimental psychology requires the deception of subjects a ou : true nature of the experiment. This has the advantage of minimizing the effect t ne subject’s knowledge might have on the experiment. But this particular met - odology is inappropriate when the object of the investigation Is the subject S own consciousness. In this case, a more suitable approach is one in which the i- chotomous subject/experimenter relationship is modified: Perhaps subjects should be regarded as—to borrow an anthropological term—participant— observers. What about the problem of the uncertain reliability of introspective accounts of consciousness? There are two strategies likely to increase our confidence in the reliability of subjective reports: In the first place, it helps to study biehly trained (and lucid) subjects who are skillful reporters. Second, we can make use of the fact that the convergent agreement of physiological measures and subjec- ive reports provides a degree of validation to the latter (Stoyva and Kamiya, 1968). The fact that lucid dreamers can remember to perform predetermined ac- Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R003100140001-2