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42. McCone, “Memorandum of Discussion with Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Friday, October 5, 1962, 5:15 p.m.” cowed Memorandum of Discussion with Mr. McGeorge Bundy Friday, October §, 1962, 5:15 p.m. 1. MeCons reviewed detaiia of the Donovan negotiations, discussions with the President, Attorney General, Elsenhower, the decisions net to approach Congressional leadership, the discussion with Senator Javits, and the final report from Donovan. Bundy expressed general agreement. 2. At the October 4th mecting of ths Speeial Group Mongoose was dis- cussed in some detail as was the meeting with Carter, Lansdale, et al in DCI's office on that day. McCons stated there was a feeling in CIA and Defense that the “activist policy’ which founded the Mongoose o was gone and that while no specific operational activities had been (refused) the arnount of noise’! from minor incidents such as the sugsr, the students firing on the Havana Hotel and other matters and the extreme caution ex- pressed by State had led to this conclusion. More importantly, however, the decisions to restrict U-Z flights kad placed the United States Intelligence Community in a position where it could not report with assurance the development of offensive capabilities in Cuba. McCone stated he felt iz most probable that Soviet-Castro operations would end up with an established offensive capability in Cuba including MRBMs. McCone stated he thought this a probability rather than a mere possibility. Bundy took issue stating that he felt the Soviets would not go that far, that he was satisfied that no offensive capability would be installed in Cube because of its world-wide effects and therefore seamed relaxed over the fact that the Intelligence Community cannot produce hard information onthis important subject. MMcCone said that Bundy’s viewpoint was reflected by many in the Intelligence Community, perhaps a majority, but he just did not agree and furthermore did not think the United States could afford to take such a risk. 3. Bundy then philosophized on Cuba stating that he felt that our policy was not clear, our objectives not determined and therefore our efforts ware not productive. He discussed both the Mongoose operations and the Rostow "Track Two", Bundy was not critical of either or of the Lansdale operations. It was obvious that he was not in sympathy with a more active role such as those discussed at 5412 on Thursday as ke felt none of them would bring Castro down nor would they particularly enhance U.S. position of world leadership. Bundy seemed inclined to support thea Track Two ides and also inclined (though he was not specific) to play down the morse active Lansdale pte SETS