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56. McCone, Memorandum for the File, “Conversation with General Eisenhower—Wednesday, 17 October 1962” Wanre’ 2 -SEGRER. CTES-CREY 17 October 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE SUBJECT: Conversation with General Eisenhower - Wednesday, 17 October 1962 At President Kennedy's request I called on General Eisenhower today at 12:00 o'clock. Reviewed the Cuban developments. President Kennedy had asked that I carefully avoid indicating any particular line of action as none had been agreed upon, and this was observed. I briefed Eisenhower on all aspects of the recent Cuban-Soviet build-up and showed him the U-2 pictures of three MRBM missile sites under development. Eisenhower expressed no particular surprise indicating that he felt this offensive build-up would probably occur. He then expressed criticism of the Bay of Pigs failure and also publicly embraced Communism. With respect to the current situation, Eisenhower felt that it would prove to be intolerable, that its purposes can not be clearly defined, and that @ discussions @= adamant demands to either Khrushchev or Castro or both, would be of no avail. In discussing blockades, he mentioned the difficulty of type of action we would take if and when a Soviet ship, laden with military hardware and personnel, is stopped on the high seas. The question he raised, as dol, is "What would we do with the ship then?" Eisenhower questioned Limited military action as being indecisive, irritating world opinion, creating fear in all areas where the Soviets could retaliate with limited action and therefore would be indecieive jnacuiscak He recalled that when President Truman ordered limited air support in the first two or three days of the Korean war, he, Eisenhower, told the President that from a military standpoint this would not work and more decisive action was required. i | \ i i | i | | | the fact that we did not respond more energetically when Castro iy | ‘ 167